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1 Introduction
The implications of decentralisation for minority and
marginalised groups are complex and contested. It
has long been an article of faith for ‘decentralisation
and participation’ advocates that bringing decision
making closer to the grassroots is a prerequisite for
overcoming the unresponsiveness of monolithic,
top-down state service delivery systems or
unaccountable, exclusionary privatised ones (Tendler
1997). Other observers, however, have drawn
attention to the difficulty of ensuring that
decentralisation actually contributes to the
democratisation of the ‘authoritarian enclaves’ (Fox
1994), where minority groups – and particularly
indigenous peoples – tend to be concentrated. They
have also noted that in general the process will tend
to leave more power in the hands of local élites
who are often implicated in maintaining and
exploiting these groups’ political and economic
marginalisation (Manor 1999).
These issues are particularly salient in Brazil. In the
two decades since the end of the military
dictatorship in 1985, the country has undergone one
of the most extensive decentralisation processes in
the world, accompanied by the implementation of
one of the most robust legal and policy frameworks
for citizen participation. However, Brazil’s notorious
social and economic inequalities have remained
stubbornly persistent, and their links with historical
and continuing exclusion along the lines of gender,
race and ethnicity have become increasingly
apparent. Dominated for years by the discourse on
universalising cidadania (citizenship) and fierce
denunciation of the risk that ‘neoliberal’ strategies
such as targeting and outsourcing pose to the
securing of equal rights for all citizens, the Brazilian
social policy debate now reflects on the implications
of the country’s ‘pluri-ethnic’ nature, and more
generally on the need for service delivery to develop
new approaches to dealing with difference.
This article explores these issues by examining the
decentralisation of a specific service – healthcare –
and its implications for a specific marginalised group
– indigenous peoples. Section 2 gives a brief
overview of decentralisation and participation in the
Brazilian health sector. Section 3 outlines the
particular issues affecting healthcare for indigenous
peoples in Brazil and traces developments in policy
from the struggles which preceded the 1988
Constitution, through the subsequent
decentralisation reforms, to the recent changes
brought in by the government of President Luís
Inácio Lula da Silva (Lula). Section 4 describes the
case study of the Rio Negro region in the northwest
Amazon, and examines the trajectory of the Rio
Negro Special Indigenous Health District. Section 5
focuses on the roles of indigenous movement
organisations in two areas of health policy within the
region – participation for service accountability and
outsourced service management – and examines
their effectiveness and limitations in their relations
with other local and national actors in the health
system. Section 6 concludes with the lessons from
this case study, and discusses their relevance to wider
debates on social movement engagement with the
state, the creation of participation spaces and the
relations between minority groups, local élites and
central government policymakers under
decentralisation.
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2 Health system decentralisation in Brazil
Brazil has historically been characterised by
alternating waves of centralisation and
decentralisation, with the most recent cycle seeing
the country emerge in the 1980s from two decades
of strongly centralising military dictatorship to
transform itself into a highly decentralised federation
(Melo and Rezende 2004: 37). The 1988 post-military
Constitutional settlement left Brazil with one of the
world’s highest levels of fiscal decentralisation and
provided space for a wave of democratic innovation
at the lowest level of sub-national government, that
of the country’s 5,500 municipalities. This
combination of decentralisation and democratisation
has now reached virtually all areas of social policy,
but its progress has been uneven across sectors. It is
in the health sector that the process began first and
reached furthest – with health, as a result, ‘coming
to represent the paradigm of sectoral
decentralisation’ (Melo and Rezende 2004: 44).
The struggle for democratisation in the concluding
years of the military dictatorship was marked both by
deep mistrust of the ‘bureaucratic-authoritarian’
state among social movements and by the desire on
the part of reformers aligned with these movements
to maintain the centrality of the state in the
implementation of policies to tackle the country’s
profound social and economic inequalities. This led to
the framing of participation both as a right in itself
and as a mechanism for controle social or ‘citizen
oversight’ of state-implemented social policies.
In the reform process which resulted in the 1988
Constitution, the advocates of controle social found
themselves converging with a resurgent ‘municipalist’
lobby of local and regional politicians who sought to
increase the level of fiscal transfers to sub-national
governments (Souza 1997). The urban Left, well-
established in the major metropolitan centres (and
soon to be victorious in municipal elections in key
cities such as São Paulo and Porto Alegre), was
happy to support a municipalist agenda, despite the
reservations of rural social movements – including
that of Brazil’s indigenous peoples – who were
reluctant to see further transfers of power to the
local élites whom they regarded as among their
most dangerous opponents.
The result of this convergence was a set of
constitutional provisions which empowered the
municipalities and institutionalised mechanisms of
civil society and citizen participation in their
governance. The Constitution mandated higher levels
of (both earmarked and un-earmarked) fiscal
transfers to the municipalities. It also mandated the
coexistence of institutions of representative
democracy (directly elected executive mayors and
municipal legislators) with deliberative-democratic
mechanisms such as the Conselhos (councils) for
sectoral policy oversight. This transformed Brazil’s
municipalities into a key locus of struggle over the
implementation of social policies (Coelho et al.
2002). At the same time, however, some of the
policy areas which had been the focus of rural social
movements’ struggles – including land reform and
indigenous rights – remained under federal control.
Until the mid-1980s, the Brazilian health system was
characterised both by centralisation and by exclusion.
State curative services were concentrated in urban-
based hospital care and open only to the relatively
small proportion of the population who were in
formal-sector employment (Costa 2004: 2). For the
most part, the rural and peri-urban poor only
encountered state health services in the form of top-
down programmes such as the military-style vector
extermination campaigns run by the Public Health
Campaigns Superintendency (SUCAM). Where
sporadic outreach initiatives did extend some state
curative services into rural areas, as in the case of the
Amazonian field hospital network run by the Public
Health Services Foundation (FSESP), these services
were generally under direct federal control, with
little effort made to engage the local population in
their management.
As the deepening economic crisis of the late 1970s
and early 1980s weakened both the military
dictatorship’s grip on power and the state’s ability to
fund even the limited existing public health services,
policymakers began to cast around for alternative
models (Coelho et al. 2002: 66). This provided an
opening for reformers involved in piloting more
inclusive ‘community health’ approaches in local
projects (sponsored by universities or the Roman
Catholic church) to begin occupying key positions in
the federal and state level health bureaucracy, while
still maintaining their links with the emerging
grassroots health movement (Weyland 1995; Costa
2004).
This movement had gathered strength under the
dictatorship, as health emerged as one of the few
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arenas where popular mobilisation was not met with
immediate repression and where middle-class
professionals were able to engage with communities
without attracting the attention of the secret police.
One of its key centres was in the East Zone of São
Paulo, where community activists set up the first
Conselhos as popular spaces for demanding health
service accountability. Although they were initially
created outside the health system’s legal framework,
these Conselhos were to prove highly influential in
shaping the provision for participation and controle
social in later constitutional and sectoral reforms
(Costa 2004: 5).
During the 1980s, this alliance between community
activists and progressive professionals became
consolidated as the Movimento Sanitarista
(Movement for Public Health). Their high point was
the Eigth National Health Conference in 1986, which
proclaimed health to be ‘the duty of the state and
the right of the citizen’ and enshrined key principles
of universality, decentralisation and participation as
the normative basis of health system reform. Two
years later these principles were written into the
Constitution, and in 1990 the framework for
operationalising them was established by a Basic
Health Law, creating the Unified Health System
(SUS) as the mechanism for universalisation of
services. This framework included a requirement for
municipalities to establish Conselhos with 50 per cent
user representation and extensive powers of service
and spending oversight as a condition for federal
transfers of funding for health services. While the
first Conselhos had emerged as a result of bottom-up
mobilisation, it was this federal ‘participation
conditionality’ which spurred a massive proliferation
of deliberative health councils at the municipal level
throughout the 1990s – with no fewer than 98.5 per
cent of municipalities having established a health
Conselho by 1999 (Melo and Rezende 2004: 46).
Despite the strength of formal provision for user
participation and controle social, a number of studies
have drawn attention to the limitations of the
Conselho system in ensuring accountability and pro-
poor targeting of health spending. These failings have
been attributed to the persistence of authoritarian
social relations and the attempts by mayors to pack
Conselhos with their own political clients (above all in
smaller, more rural municipalities); as well as to the
tendency of bureaucrats and health professionals to
privilege ‘technical’ discourses, excluding traditional
and popular knowledge from the Councils’
deliberations (Coelho et al. 2002). In recent years, as
the SUS has rolled out a series of standardised
packages for extending access to services, the
emphasis of social movement and civil society
mobilisation has shifted towards demands for the
recognition of social difference as a key element in
securing genuine equity (Costa 2004: 11). These
demands have brought a broader range of actors –
including the feminist, Afro-Brazilian and gay rights
movements – into a debate which had previously
focused only on the ‘special case’ of indigenous
peoples.
3 Indigenous peoples and the Brazilian health
system
Historically, health services for indigenous peoples in
Brazil existed separate to the mainstream health
system. This disconnection reflected the ‘special
status’ of indigenous Brazilians, who until the 1988
Constitution, were formally designated as wards of
the state. For many years, any ‘modern’ medical
services were provided by missionaries or
(sporadically) by the ‘flying health teams’ of the
government Indian Protection Service (SPI) and its
successor, the National Indian Foundation (FUNAI)
(Verani 1999). These services were unable to reverse
or even allay the devastating impact of introduced
diseases (sometimes deliberately spread as a means
of ‘pacifying’ hostile tribes) and of the deteriorating
living conditions which resulted from interethnic
contact. Localised projects implemented by non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) and university
departments from the 1970s onwards developed
more appropriate models, but they were unable to
forge systematic links with government services and
policy. With the growth of indigenous peoples’
movements in the 1980s and their establishment of
an alliance with elements of the Movimento
Sanitarista this began to change, and in the 1990s
the outline of a new policy framework emerged.
However, the hostility of both indigenous
movements and their allies to the local élites who
dominated the remote and rural municipalities
where the indigenous population was largely to be
found, ensured that this new framework differed
from the mainstream SUS in one important respect:
it avoided municipalisation and instead maintained
the health of indigenous people as a ‘federal issue’
under the direct responsibility of the Ministry of
Health.
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Despite the scarcity of reliable data, epidemics of
introduced diseases are widely recognised as having
been a major factor (alongside genocidal violence
and exclusion from access to natural resources) in the
vertiginous population decline following each
indigenous group’s contact with non-indigenous
society. Even though the indigenous population (now
reduced to fewer than half a million in a country of
170 million people) stabilised and grew again in the
1990s, health indicators remain significantly worse
than for the population in general. According to one
study, infant mortality rates among indigenous
people in the Amazon in 2000 were 74.6 per 1,000;
more than double the Brazilian average of 31.8 per
1,000 (Garnelo et al. 2003: 64). These problems are
compounded by difficulties of access, with many
communities living several days’ walk or boat journey
from the nearest hospital.
Although they have been unable to deal with many
introduced diseases, traditional health systems
remain an important resource for indigenous people.
Encompassing a variety of practices from shamanic
ritual to the use of medicinal plants, these systems
include curative interventions and practices which
contribute to the preservation of other aspects of
well-being (Athias 2004). The need for integration of
traditional knowledge has been mentioned in
Brazilian health policy documents since the 1990s,
though virtually no progress has been made in
putting these statements of intent into practice
(Coimbra et al. 2006: 143).
Current policy on health services for indigenous
peoples centres on the ‘Special Indigenous Health
District’ (DSEI) model. DSEIs are management units
whose area of service coverage is based on the
territories of one or more indigenous peoples, which
often cross municipal – and even state – boundaries.
This model emerged at the Second National
Conference on the Health of Indigenous Peoples in
1993, supported by an alliance of indigenous
movements and health professionals aligned with
the Movimento Sanitarista. The conference
mandated the creation of a ‘specific subsystem’ of
the SUS to be managed by the Ministry of Health,
but years of bureaucratic turf wars between the
Ministry’s executive arm – the National Health
Foundation (FUNASA) – and the government
indigenous affairs agency, FUNAI, ensured that it did
not begin to be consolidated until the late 1990s,
after an international outcry at the deaths from
disease of hundreds of Yanomami people had
prompted the creation of the Yanomami Health
District as the first DSEI.
The process of establishing DSEIs across Brazil began
in 1998. At the time, the Brazilian Social Democratic
Party (PSDB) government of President Fernando
Henrique Cardoso was heavily committed to the
principle of outsourcing services, a commitment
attributed to a combination of ideological belief in
the virtues of the ‘third sector’ and practical need to
comply with International Monetary Fund (IMF)
agreements restricting new hiring in the civil service
(Costa 2004; Melo and Rezende 2004). Given this
context, FUNASA initiated the new system not by
recruiting more field staff of its own but by signing
service-delivery contracts with an assortment of
different providers. In addition to NGOs, missionary
groups and university departments, these included
indigenous movement organisations and municipal
health secretariats. The result was that in some
areas, a de facto municipalisation began to take
shape, while in others indigenous movements found
themselves involved simultaneously on both the
demand side and the supply side of service delivery.
This diversity of service delivery arrangements
reflected a number of factors. One was the critical
scarcity of human and organisational resources
capable of responding to the challenge of
establishing adequate services. Unable to hire new
personnel of its own and with an existing staff
consisting mainly of former FSESP field hospital
administrators and SUCAM malaria control campaign
managers with little or no previous experience of
working with indigenous peoples, FUNASA was
forced to look for partners wherever it could find
them. Another factor was the heterogeneity of the
social and political contexts in the 34 DSEIs, some of
which covered scattered tribal groups with little
previous contact with non-indigenous society, while
others contained relatively numerous peoples with
well-established movement organisations. The
implications of this heterogeneity for the
mechanisms of controle social which (in line with SUS
principles) were supposed to be built into the DSEIs
were significant. The DSEI model provided for
50 per cent indigenous representation on district
level Conselhos as the main vehicle for participation,
but the extent to which local indigenous movement
organisations had the resources to make effective
use of these spaces varied considerably.
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With the establishment of the DSEIs, the federal
government was able to channel significantly
increased resources into meeting the health needs of
indigenous peoples. The budget for indigenous
health services reached 124 million reais (over US$40
million) in 2002, almost a fourfold increase in dollar
terms on its 1995 level. However, the performance
of the system failed to match these investments.
Although some indicators (including immunisation
coverage) improved significantly, indigenous
movements repeatedly denounced the system’s
inability to meet community health needs, and
reports of widespread deaths of indigenous people
from preventable diseases continued to appear in the
media (COIAB 2000; ISA 2004).
Explanations for the disappointing performance of
the system focused on the relationship between
FUNASA and the outsourced providers. One review
noted that:
FUNASA, which should have provided technical
and operational support to the contracted service
providers, attracted a range of criticisms, above all
for trying to impose an unreconstructed version
of the aims of the SUS on an indigenous health
subsystem operating in a reality with which public
health specialists had little familiarity ... allowing in
by the back door some of the worst practices
which had marked indigenous [health] services in
the ‘wards of the state’ period. (Barroso-
Hoffmann et al. 2004: 311, authors’ translation)
Frustration with the inability of FUNASA to fulfil its
enabling role adequately – and in particular with the
frequent delays in funding transfers which left staff
unpaid and medicine supply chains disrupted – led
several NGOs to pull out of the service contracts.
After the 2002 elections they added their voices to
those calling for the new federal government of
Workers’ Party (PT) President Lula to ‘renationalise’
the service by providing an operational structure for
the DSEIs to operate as decentralised units fully
under the aegis of the Ministry of Health. There was
little change in policy, however, until 2004 when a
series of scandals over misappropriation of funds in
several DSEIs led FUNASA to announce an abrupt
shift in direction.
In the event, FUNASA’s ‘new model’ combined
heavy recentralisation of budgeting and purchasing
decisions with the maintenance of the practice of
hiring staff under outsourcing arrangements rather
than directly through the Ministry (ISA 2004). For
many NGO activists and indigenous leaders, this was
the worst of both worlds. It did away with much of
the potential for flexibility and adaptation to local
needs offered by decentralisation, without replacing
it with a state-delivered service that could be held to
account through the rights-claiming strategies that
the movements were accustomed to deploying. The
government responded to the continued criticism by
looking to the decentralisation model of the
mainstream SUS. In the face of ongoing problems
with the operationalisation of the DSEI model, by
2005 FUNASA had begun to float the idea of
outright municipalisation of the indigenous health
system. This sparked furious protests among
indigenous movements, who despite their often
traumatic experiences of dealing with the federal
government continued to believe that it would be
even more damaging if more power and resources
were to be transferred to local administrations –
whom they generally identified as complicit with
systematic attempts by local élites to deny indigenous
peoples’ rights and plunder their natural resources.
4 Health system decentralisation in the
Rio Negro region
Among the largest and longest-established DSEIs is
that covering the Rio Negro region, located in the
far northwest of the Brazilian Amazon (along the
borders with Colombia and Venezuela), and which is
one of the most important centres of indigenous
movement organising in Brazil. Its main municipality,
São Gabriel da Cachoeira, is inhabited by some
30,000 members of 22 ethnic groups belonging to
four different linguistic families, and is one of the
very few Brazilian municipalities with an indigenous
majority among its citizens.
The Rio Negro region represents a valuable site for
analysis of indigenous health service decentralisation
because it has many of the potential preconditions
for successful implementation of the DSEI model: a
history of organising around access to health
services, a clear regional identity and a strong local
indigenous peoples’ movement able to access
support from technically competent NGOs. Although
considered one of the more successful DSEIs, it too
has failed to fulfil expectations and has seen its share
of reports denouncing avoidable deaths among
indigenous people in areas supposedly covered by its
services (ISA 2004). In this context, the fact that the
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cultural and political fragmentation and lack of
management capacity which have bedevilled other
DSEIs are largely absent from the Rio Negro region
makes it easier for a case study of the region to
isolate the systemic issues, which may have
contributed to the broader failure of the model to
live up to expectations.
Although there are some more favourable elements
in its particular social and political context, in general
the Rio Negro region resembles other Amazonian
DSEIs in the practical challenges which it poses for
efforts to establish a comprehensive indigenous
health service. Its indigenous population inhabits
over 600 villages scattered over a vast area (the
municipality of São Gabriel da Cachoeira itself, which
covers only two-thirds of the DSEI area, extends for
108,000 km2). There are virtually no roads, and
several sets of rapids make river access difficult,
requiring health teams to carry their equipment long
distances through the rainforest.
Two powerful actors, the army and the church, also
complicate the outlook for indigenous participation
in a decentralised health service. The region’s
strategic border location has long been associated
with a heavy military presence, which has recently
grown still further in response to the intensification
of the conflict in neighbouring Colombia. Much of
the Rio Negro region’s health infrastructure –
including the main hospital in São Gabriel – is run by
a military that is traditionally hostile to indigenous
rights-claiming. The Catholic Church’s Salesian
Mission, active in the region since 1916, maintains a
heavy presence with schools and catechism groups in
most villages and a number of local health centres
staffed by nuns. In the Rio Negro region, the church
has long maintained a policy of trying to stamp out
the indigenous curative practices linked with
shamanism – labelled by the missionaries as coisas do
diabo or ‘things of the devil’.
Following a 20-year campaign, most of the Rio
Negro region was finally demarcated as an
Indigenous Territory in 1998. This land struggle was
led by the Federation of Indigenous Peoples’
Organisations of the Rio Negro (FOIRN), which
brings together 54 indigenous community
associations based in the region. FOIRN and its
affiliated associations are formally organised for
engagement with non-indigenous society, but the
practices of leadership selection and decision making
through which they operate are closely articulated
with traditional governance systems based on clan
hierarchies and interethnic exchange relations.
FOIRN has emerged as a significant political actor at
the national, regional and local levels, but it is far
from hegemonic in São Gabriel da Cachoeira; the
fact that 92 per cent of the municipal population is
indigenous has not translated directly into economic
or political power. The local economy is in the hands
of non-indigenous traders to whom many indigenous
people are permanently in debt, and migrants from
elsewhere in the country dominate municipal
politics, securing indigenous votes through the time-
honoured clientelistic practices of the Brazilian
interior. FOIRN-backed candidates have occasionally
been elected to the municipal legislature, but
internal divisions and the lack of resources for
competitive vote-buying mean that the federation
has yet to elect a mayor in São Gabriel.
Ironically, in view of the indigenous movement’s
broad adherence to DSEIs as an alternative to
municipalisation, it was actually at a Municipal Health
Conference in São Gabriel da Cachoeira in 1997 that
the proposal for the Rio Negro DSEI took shape. The
proposal resulted from an intense process of inter-
institutional negotiation involving the indigenous
movement, NGOs, the church, local politicians and
even the army, with groups who were often in
conflict over their competing visions for the region
demonstrating an impressive level of political
maturity in coming together in the search for joint
solutions to the challenges that none was capable of
addressing individually. There was broad agreement
both on the need to divide up areas of responsibility
and on the importance of training indigenous health
workers to ensure coverage at the village level. In the
event, the region was divided into five zones, with a
different organisation taking lead responsibility for
primary care provision in each zone while following
joint plans on village health worker training,
immunisation and other core strategies.
FUNASA duly signed service provision contacts with
the different organisations (two NGOs, two church
agencies and the municipal health secretariats of São
Gabriel and the neighbouring municipality of Santa
Isabel), which reflected this territorial distribution. A
district level Conselho was established, with a leading
role reserved for FOIRN, which received health
policy advisory support from one of the NGOs,
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Associação Saúde Sem Limites (SSL). The regional
office of FUNASA was confined largely to a
supporting role, above all in procurement. Despite
teething troubles as the different institutions
struggled to get used to their new roles, initial levels
of enthusiasm were high. Parts of the region which
had never had regular access to biomedical services
began to receive visits from immunisation teams,
indigenous health workers travelled to town for
training courses and permanent health posts were
built in the upriver areas and equipped with
speedboats for evacuation of critical cases to the
military hospital in São Gabriel.
It was not long, however, before the cracks began to
show. Federal budget squeezes reduced the flow of
funds, and FUNASA transfers to the contracted
service providers became erratic. Dozens of medical
and nursing staff went unpaid for months, exposing
the institutions that had hired them to potentially
ruinous labour court actions. Differences in approach
and capacity among the different providers caused
friction, and neither FUNASA on the technical front
nor FOIRN on the political side was able to impose a
common line. In the absence of effective overall
coordination, an alliance of like-minded organisations
(SSL, one of the church agencies and FOIRN)
proposed forming a consortium to take over
management of the whole DSEI. The strategy
foundered on the difficulty of getting the necessary
contractual arrangements in place and, in 2002, as
the delays in resource transfers became worse, first
SSL and then the other providers decided to pull out,
refusing to renew their contracts. Without service
providers willing to accept outsourcing contracts and
prevented by austerity measures from hiring field
teams of its own, FUNASA faced the prospect of
the collapse of the DSEI. In the event, it was FOIRN
itself that stepped in to accept a service provision
contract, leaving the movement uneasily straddling
both the demand and the supply side of indigenous
health services in the Rio Negro region.
5 Indigenous movement organisations and
health policy in the Rio Negro region
Since its foundation in 1987, FOIRN had responded
to its constituents’ priorities by placing health high
on the list of demands around which it coordinated
indigenous mobilisation in the Rio Negro region.
Unlike other regional indigenous movements,
however, the federation was reluctant to accept
management responsibility for providing the services
it accused the government of failing to deliver, even
when invited to do so by NGOs with access to
international funding. It was only after the collapse
of FUNASA’s initial outsourcing arrangements in
2002 that FOIRN agreed to take on management
responsibility for the DSEI. Before that, the
federation and its affiliated organisations had been
engaged in other participation strategies: occupying
officially created spaces to press for accountability
and recognition of community needs, and organising
outside the official system to promote a different
approach to health.
FOIRN’s initial reluctance to take on a management
role in the district had an organisational dimension as
well as a political one: the federation had seen the
administrative strain, which complying with FUNASA
contracting arrangements had placed even on well-
established NGOs, and had no illusions about the
difficulty of managing a large contingent of assertive
and opinionated non-indigenous professionals as well
as the growing corps of indigenous village health
workers. Why then did FOIRN give in to FUNASA’s
pressure and agree to sign an outsourcing contract
when the NGOs pulled out?
When asked this question during the authors’ initial
research in 2004, the federation’s outgoing
president responded that ‘we accepted the
management of the district to fulfil our commitment
to represent the grassroots, and to avoid the DSEI
being handed over to the municipal government.’
This answer reveals the extent to which
accountability to communities and resisting
municipalisation had become intertwined in the
movement’s political logic. There is no doubt that
FOIRN’s leaders were under intense pressure from
their constituencies as well as from FUNASA not to
allow the DSEI to fail and services to be withdrawn.
The fact that they rejected the alternative strategy of
encouraging the transfer of responsibility to the
municipality while simultaneously intensifying their
efforts to hold the elected local government to
account for the delivery of the service suggests a
complete lack of faith in the possibility of a genuinely
accountable municipal administration. It may also
suggest that in recognising the potential of health
service delivery to pay political dividends, FOIRN’s
leaders not only wanted to keep this potential out of
the hands of the non-indigenous municipal élite but
also had their eye on what it could yield for their
own political projects.
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Initially, this strategy seemed to pay off. Although
there were some administrative difficulties, the
FOIRN-managed Rio Negro DSEI encountered
nothing like the scandals over resource
misappropriation by subcontracted providers –
indigenous and non-indigenous alike – which
crippled other districts. While tensions between
non-indigenous professionals and the indigenous
leaders who were officially their line managers did
occasionally flare up, they were generally handled
with skilful diplomacy by the FOIRN-appointed DSEI
coordinator, a former president of the federation.
The Rio Negro DSEI even began to gain a reputation
as something of a model, looked to enviously by
movements in other parts of Brazil. One former
FOIRN health representative interviewed during the
initial research in 2004 commented that ‘in Rio
Negro the District has strengthened our movement;
in other Districts, though, the professionals were too
strong ... the movements ended up as functionaries
of the health policy ... for the other movements, it
seems like health work was a separate thing, which
couldn’t be combined with political work, but FOIRN
has developed health work and political work
together.’
Significantly, however, FOIRN’s vision for ‘political
work’ did not extend to challenging the ‘technical’
priorities for resource allocation. These priorities
continued to be decided by non-indigenous health
professionals working in the district, following policy
parameters determined by FUNASA in Brasília. There
was no scope for adapting the DSEI’s management
approach to reflect indigenous political culture and
styles of decision making, as the demands of
bureaucratic routine consumed the energies of the
FOIRN leaders involved in running the district.
Initiatives such as cultural sensitisation training of
newly arrived professionals (started by SSL when it
and other NGOs had been playing a leading role in
running the district) fell by the wayside as the DSEI’s
management concentrated on meeting centrally set
targets.
In an ironic reversal of the conventional wisdom, the
Rio Negro DSEI under indigenous movement
management was both more efficiently run and less
distinctively ‘indigenous’ in its priority-setting than it
had been when non-indigenous service providers
were in charge. The traditional healers’ association
CERCI (Centro de Estudos e Revitizalização da
Cultura Indígena) made little headway in its efforts
to promote a broader understanding and inclusion of
traditional healing practice within the DSEI, despite
CERCI’s status as a FOIRN affiliate and the
supportive statements made by many FOIRN leaders.
As the FOIRN-appointed DSEI Coordinator made
clear when interviewed, there appeared to be no
way to translate the demands of the healers’
movement into the language of health policy and
‘technical’ priority-setting:
Even those [indigenous people] who have a
university education aren’t managing to do the
translation for their relatives in the villages. In the
area of traditional medicine [health professionals]
aren’t understanding it because we don’t know
how to explain it to them. We need the
movement to translate for the professionals and
the professionals to take this way of thinking on
board. The difference in understandings is very
great.
Despite its close adherence to the official model, it
was not long before FOIRN found itself confronting
the same problems with FUNASA which had led the
NGOs to abandon their outsourcing contracts.
Funding transfers became erratic, exposing the
federation to the risk of legal action by unpaid
medical staff. In 2004, FUNASA’s new policy on
recentralising budgeting and procurement decisions
– prompted by the corruption and mismanagement
scandals in other DSEIs – was enforced in the Rio
Negro region despite the district’s relatively good
record, and FOIRN was pushed into agreeing to
scale back its management role to little more than
that of a contracting agency for health staff.
This agreement failed to preserve the level of
services. Resource transfers were repeatedly held up,
and in December 2004 NGOs again denounced the
deaths from preventable diseases of several
indigenous people living in areas where drug supplies
had dried up and health centres had been abandoned
by staff who had gone unpaid for months. FOIRN
and its indigenous movement allies responded by
occupying the headquarters of FUNASA in the state
capital, Manaus, to protest at the delays in funding
transfers (ISA 2004). Although the federation did not
formally withdraw from its contract with FUNASA,
by this resort to direct action FOIRN signalled that
the movement it represented had not abandoned its
original rights-claiming strategies established long
before it became involved in outsourcing.
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After a temporary respite, the problem of delayed
transfers recurred, and by mid-2005 FOIRN was
openly discussing withdrawal from the contract.
When, in early 2006, FUNASA signalled that it was
planning further recentralisation measures, FOIRN’s
leaders formally stated that they would end the
outsourcing agreement. However, when a series of
local health council meetings were held throughout
the Rio Negro region to discuss the situation, they
voted overwhelmingly for the movement to retain
formal responsibility for the district and campaign for
FUNASA to implement the proposals for granting
management autonomy to DSEIs which had been
approved by the March 2006 National Indigenous
Health Conference. The result was a stand-off with
FUNASA, whose national policy was increasingly
shifting towards municipalisation of indigenous
healthcare delivery combined with centralised
control of budgeting and procurement. Finally, in
November 2006 FOIRN formally withdrew from
management of the DSEI and announced its
intention to return to a role focused solely on
ensuring effective user participation in service
oversight, or controle social. 
In contrast with the federation’s initial reluctance to
become involved in service management, from the
outset FOIRN and its affiliated organisations had
played an active role in the district’s arrangements
for controle social. The Rio Negro DSEI followed the
standard SUS pattern of establishing formal
accountability of the district management to a
Health Council with significant user representation
and broad powers of budget and planning oversight.
In addition to this district Conselho, the management
structure of the DSEI also included local health
councils at the subregional level, intended to monitor
the performance of local health units and identify
priority issues to be referred upwards for action at
the district level.
The boundaries of the local councils’ subregions
followed those of FOIRN’s own administrative units,
and the federation used its network of local
movement organisers as facilitators to provide
political and logistical support for council meetings.
This support was coordinated by a department staffed
by FOIRN-appointed indigenous leaders, housed
within the DSEI and funded from the district budget.
Several participants interviewed during the research
confirmed the importance of this political and
material support, pointing out that local health
council meetings generally happened only when the
FOIRN organisers visited local leaders to encourage
them to participate and the DSEI released funds to
transport representatives from the scattered
communities of each subregion to the villages where
meetings would be held. Nevertheless, the
department was repeatedly threatened with closure –
first when FUNASA imposed drastic cuts in funding
for controle social support as part of the
reorganisation of DSEI services in 2004, and
subsequently as the stand-off over recentralisation
developed in 2006. Though there were many
complaints at this threat, there was no mass
mobilisation to resist it on the part of the movement.
The relative absence of political struggle over the
fate of the controle social system suggests a lack of
ownership linked to evidence of widespread
indigenous disenchantment with the system’s
capacity to provide genuine space for voice and
influence. Interviews with participants and
examination of the minutes of local health council
meetings painted a picture of spaces where non-
indigenous professionals set the agenda, and where
indigenous leaders recited complaints and wish lists
but little genuine deliberation took place. Even
where the discussion ranged more broadly –
reflecting the indigenous vision of health as
inseparable from issues around land, natural
resources and social and spiritual well-being – the
issues referred up to the district level almost always
concerned the narrow specifics of drug supply,
health-post location and the attendance records of
non-indigenous health professionals.
At the district level, the bureaucratisation of the
participation process was even more apparent. One
of the DSEI’s controle social workers described a
typical Conselho meeting as follows:
Technical and bureaucratic questions end up
taking all the time that’s available for discussion ...
Councillors don’t manage to speak because of the
demands of the agenda, going through the
accounts eats up a lot of time and then you end
up going from a more shared discussion to a very
technical discussion, you end up focusing the
discussion on the professionals’ work ... When a
leader arrives in these spaces where it’s the
doctor’s word or the administrator’s word that
carries more weight ... he [sic] ends up leaving
without having said anything.
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Significantly, this description was applied to the
operation of the district Conselho during the period
when FOIRN had assumed management
responsibility for the DSEI – and therefore had an
absolute majority of seats, with indigenous
representatives sitting on both the service-provider
and service-user sides of the table. This
unprecedented level of formal power in the hands of
an indigenous organisation failed to change the
character of the deliberative process in the Conselho,
which continued to mirror the bureaucratic
procedures and narrow focus of discussions familiar to
observers of municipal health councils in the
mainstream SUS (Coelho et al. 2002; Cornwall 2005).
6 Conclusion
The examples discussed in the previous section
illustrate the multiple roles which organisations
representing marginalised groups can play under a
decentralisation process. In Brazil, this
decentralisation process on the face of it appears as
participatory and enabling as any described in the
literature. In comparison with other marginalised
groups in Brazil and beyond, the indigenous
organisations of the Rio Negro region seemed very
well equipped to play these roles successfully, and
thereby to strengthen the position of their
constituents. Yet on closer examination, it seems
that they failed to achieve any significant
transformation in the nature of the service.
By managing the DSEI in strict accordance with the
prescriptions emanating from FUNASA and the
Health Ministry in Brasília, FOIRN undoubtedly
gained political credibility as an interlocutor for the
non-indigenous state. However, this credibility was
not used to challenge the logic of existing policy or
argue for different priorities. Nor did FOIRN’s
leaders use their political abilities to change the
bureaucratic practice of district management.
Paradoxically, the competent management
performance which enhanced FOIRN’s external
credibility served to reinforce an approach to health-
service delivery whose bureaucratic and
technocentric nature was being challenged by
elements of FOIRN’s own movement base, as well
as by non-indigenous NGOs with which it had
formed alliances.
Part of the explanation for this outcome
undoubtedly lies with the gulf in understanding
between the specialist holders of medical knowledge
in the indigenous and non-indigenous health
systems, and the lack of cultural translation skills on
both sides to help bridge this gulf. We would argue,
however, that a more significant role was played by
the partial nature of decentralisation in the official
Brazilian system of healthcare for indigenous peoples.
Although the DSEIs were supposed to function as
decentralised units, in contrast to the municipalities
which were the focus of mainstream SUS
decentralisation, they lacked broader political
structures capable of defending their autonomy.
FOIRN may have perceived its own legitimacy and
authority as analogous to that of a municipality in
the non-indigenous system (perhaps influenced by
the experience of neighbouring Colombia, where
indigenous territories are constitutionally guaranteed
minicipal status), but it was never recognised as such
by FUNASA. Resisting municipalisation allowed the
indigenous peoples’ movement to avoid submitting
their health services to political manipulation by
unscrupulous local élites, but it left them exposed to
creeping top-down control by a centralised
bureaucracy.
This control operated not through direct political
command, but rather by hemming in the outsourced
service providers with arbitrarily imposed budget
ceilings, standardised prioritisation criteria, centrally
defined targets and complex, initiative-stifling
planning and accounting procedures. This mesh of
rules and procedures was imposed in a way which
made no distinction between service providers –
whether NGOs, municipal health secretariats or
indigenous movement organisations – and which had
the intended or unintended consequence of ensuring
the very standardisation which the DSEI model was
supposed to overcome, turning devolution into
simple deconcentration or outsourcing of predefined
functions.
The weight of centrally defined rules and procedures
was also felt by the participatory spaces that were
supposed to ensure flexibility and responsiveness to
local priorities: the local health councils and district
Conselho. This ensured that participants’ energies
were absorbed by the need to comply with formal
requirements for vertical accountability, leaving little
space for questioning the broader policy framework
and system of priorities. The effect was reinforced by
the dominance of bureaucratic and technical
framings of health problems and their potential
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solutions which flowed from the DSEI’s dependence
on non-indigenous professionals, and from the
absence of permanent mechanisms for educating
these professionals in indigenous culture or providing
for cultural translation between them and the
indigenous specialists.
Despite a longstanding tradition in the development
literature (paradigmatically represented by Rondinelli
et al. 1989) which uncritically classifies outsourcing as
a form of decentralisation, the case of indigenous
health services in Brazil demonstrates that such
conflation obscures the specific political implications
of different processes for different actors. The
experience of the Rio Negro DSEI suggests that far
from representing ‘community empowerment’, the
outsourcing of service provision to social movement
organisations may lead them to develop their skills as
players while trapping them in a position where they
lose the ability to challenge the rules of the game.
The power of these rules is not limited to centrally
defined performance targets, budget frameworks or
accounting procedures; it extends to and through the
technical and managerial discourses which define
what problems can be included in a given policy area
and what solutions can be prescribed for them. This
is especially relevant for minority or marginalised
groups with different cultural styles of debate and
decision making, or different framings of health
policy issues. Unless decentralisation, participation
and outsourcing processes build in a greater degree
of flexibility about where resources can be invested
and how decisions can be made, such groups are
likely to find that these processes leave them with
more responsibility for delivering services over which
they have ultimately less control.
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